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7.1  Introduction 
The massive growth of  income transfers over the last thirty years, 
particularly those to the elderly, is a central feature of  our recent eco- 
nomic history. In 1950, the Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insur- 
ance (OASI) trust fund paid 3.48 million retired workers and survivors, 
2.3 percent of  the population, a total of  $1.02 billion in benefits, or just 
0.45 percent of U.S.  Personal Income. In contrast, in 1979 retirement and 
survivors’ benefits under  OASI amounted to $93.13 billion,  or 4.79 
percent of  Personal Income, and the number of  recipients numbered 
30.35 million, or 13.8 percent of  the population.’ Furthermore, the ad- 
vent of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965 and of  the Supplemental Security 
Income program  (SSI)  for the elderly in  1974 (to replace  the state- 
administered old  age assistance programs), and the rapid  growth of 
federal and state and local government worker retirement programs, 
accounted for billions of  dollars of  additional transfers going totally or 
disproportionately to the elderly. The elderly are the largest group of 
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recipients of  government income transfer payments in this country, as 
well as in other economically developed countries. The expected future 
growth of  these benefits has become  a matter of  major concern  for 
economists and the general public. These facts justify careful examina- 
tion of  certain key aspects of  income transfer programs for the elderly. 
The implicit transfer policy question obviously is: Would increments at 
the margin to elderly rather than nonelderly households be equitable? 
This paper does not explicitly address this normative question. Rather, it 
addresses a prior factual question: How well-off are the elderly relative to 
the nonelderly? To that end it examines in some detail how the measured 
effect of  transfers on the economic status of  the elderly depends on the 
underlying income and recipient unit concepts. 
How economically well-off are the elderly? The simplest method of 
assessing the economic status of  a group like the elderly is to compare 
their average money income to the average of  the rest of the population 
or of other groups. Our point of departure in undertaking this study is the 
familiar one that the validity of such comparisons often depends critically 
on the income and recipient unit concepts that are used to generate the 
underlying size distributions of  economic status both before and after 
transfers? We will present several alternative measures of  the relative 
economic status of the elderly based on a number of  different treatments 
of  the income and recipient unit concepts. We begin with comparisons 
that include transfers and taxes. We then deduct taxes and examine the 
effects. Finally, we also deduct transfers and evaluate the consequences. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 7.2 discusses a new data set 
created by the authors for dealing with some well-known, but unresolved, 
problems in the measurement of  economic status. Section 7.3 then uses 
these new data to generate estimates of the economic status of consumer 
units headed by elderly and nonelderly persons, including transfers. In 
this section, income and consumption measures of  economic well-being 
receive about equal attention. Section 7.4  reports the differential effects 
of  income  transfers  on  the  economic status of  the elderly  and  the 
nonelderly.  Because we know of  no reasonable way to estimate what 
consumption would be in the absence of  transfers, this section concen- 
trates on income measures of economic well-being. Section 7.5 summa- 
rizes the main findings of  the paper and offers some implications for 
public transfer policies. 
7.2  The Data 
Economists have often expressed dissatisfaction with the quality of the 
data available for measuring economic well-being. How is it possible to 
compare the effect of income transfers on the relative economic status of 
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is known to be severely deficient in some crucial respects? This circum- 
stance is particularly troublesome, of  course, when the  deficiencies  of the 
data are known to be nonrandom between two or more groups and 
therefore cannot be assumed to cancel each other out when making 
intergroup comparisons.  This general problem  is especially pertinent 
when comparing the economic status of the elderly with that of the rest of 
the population. We have therefore resorted to two corrective procedures. 
First, we compare measures of economic well-being based on consump- 
tion as well as on income. Second, we create a new data set that corrects 
for one of  the more important deficiencies in existing consumption and 
income data. To be specific, we have combined data from the 1972-73 
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) with data from the Inventory of 
Consumer Durables (CD) of  the same survey to make consumption and 
income measures from the CEX correspond more closely to the concepts 
used in standard economic theory. 
The CEX data have been described in detail in, among other sources, 
U.S.  Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1977) and in King 
(1978). We therefore discuss here only those aspects of the data directly 
relevant to this study. First, we have restricted our analysis to consumer 
units interviewed in 1973, thereby eliminating problems associated with 
relative price changes between 1972 and 1973. In addition, we eliminated 
consumer units that were not full-year participants and also those for 
which income records were incomplete. We were left with a sample of 
9494 consumer units? The elderly are defined to be all consumer units 
headed by a person aged 65 or over; the nonelderly, as all units headed by 
a person aged 64  or younger. (We note in passing that the 5.5 percent of 
persons in institutions and group quarters were not covered in the CEX; 
consequently, elderly persons living in nursing homes were not included 
in this ~tudy.)~ 
The quality of the income data is difficult to assess. Underreporting of 
income is a serious problem in any household survey. Factor payments 
reported by consumer units in the CEX are only 91 percent of the amount 
in the National Income Accounts. The shortfall differs by income source. 
Ninety-two percent  of  wages and salaries are reported, but  only 78 
percent of federal public assistance transfers and 54 percent of  state and 
local transfers (Dalrymple 1980). The biases for comparisons of  the 
income of  the elderly and the nonelderly are offsetting to some extent. 
The elderly are more likely to receive transfers and less likely to receive 
wage and salary income than the nonelderly. But the elderly receive a 
much larger share of  federal transfers as compared to state and local 
transfers than do the nonelderly. Furthermore, Radner (1981) has re- 
ported that the elderly underreported their money income considerably 
more than did the nonelderly in the 1973 Current Population Survey. The 
same bias is likely to hold in the CEX. Finally, the CEX does not include 242  Danziger  /van der Gaag/ Smolensky  /Taussig 
most types of government-provided in-kind income (the only exception is 
food stamps), most of  which are received by the elderly, or employer- 
provided fringe benefits, most of  which are received by the nonelderly. 
Thus, neither the direction nor the magnitude of the bias by age is known. 
Consumption expenditures as measured in the CEX are defined as 
out-of-pocket  expenditures? This definition  differs  from  that  in  the 
National Income Accounts, especially with regard to durable purchases. 
If, for instance, a household buys a new car and pays in cash, the total 
expenditure appears in consumption. However, if the household makes a 
down payment and borrows the rest, only the down payment plus the 
monthly  finance charges  are counted  as consumption. If  the “down 
payment” consists of  an old car, only the finance charges are counted. 
Since it is likely that elderly households own a more extensive stock of 
durables than younger households, ignoring the contribution of durables 
(including owner-occupied  houses)  to both  income and consumption 
would bias comparisons across age groups. 
To deal with this problem, we combined data from the CD with the 
CEX to obtain consumption and income measures that are more closely 
related  to the  consumption  and  income  flow  concepts  of  economic 
theory. The CD public use tape provides information on the presence of 
major durables, minor durables, vehicles and furnishings in all house- 
holds in the 1972-73  CEX. We matched the information on the CD tape 
with the expenditure  data on the CEX tape to obtain a measure of 
household consumption that excludes expenditures on durables made 
during the year of the survey, but includes the value of consumption flows 
(service flows) from all durables present in the household (for a complete 
description, see van der Gaag et al. 1981 and appendix A). We included 
service flows from major durables and vehicles only. The value of  most 
minor  durables (toaster,  mixer, hair  dryer, etc.) is small enough  to 
warrant treating them as nondurables. The CD tape does not contain 
information on the value of  house furnishings, which prevents us from 
calculating service flows from furniture. The services derived from own- 
er-occupied  housing are included as a substitute for expenditures on 
home purchases in the consumption measure and as an addition to the 
income measure. 
The reported measures of income and consumption are quite different 
from the adjusted, theoretically more appropriate, ones. The results vary 
both by age of the household head and by income class. One surprising 
outcome of these adjustments is that “consumer expenditures” from the 
CEX is  a  pretty  good proxy  for total  “consumption”  by  nonelderly 
households. The corrections for service flows from, and expenditures on, 
owner-occupied homes, durables, and vehicles tend to cancel so that, on 
average, the ratio of reported to adjusted consumer expenditures is 1.00 
($9813/$9807 in table 7.1). For elderly households, however, adjusted Table 7.1  Quintile Shares, Gini Coefficients, and Means for Consumption and Income after Taxes, 1973: CEX Consumption and Income 
Measures Reported and Adjusted for Durable Flows 
Quintile  Shares  Mean 
1  2  3  4  5  Coefficient  Status 
Gini  Economic 
I. All consumer units 
1. Reported CEX consumption  6.26  11.91  17.11  23.58  41.14  ,351  $  8,855 
2.  Adjusted consumption  6.90  12.64  17.45  23.56  39.44  .327  9,014 
3.  Reported CEX income after taxes  4.75  11.16  17.21  24.32  42.56  ,382  11,115 
4.  Adjusted income after taxes  4.96  11.14  17.19  24.50  42.21  .377  12,989 
1. Reported CEX consumption  7.39  12.78  17.40  22.90  39.52  ,321  9,813 
2.  Adjusted consumption  7.80  13.25  17.74  23.10  38.10  ,303  9,807 
4.  Adjusted income after taxes  5.78  12.17  17.73  23.95  40.37  ,348  14,217 
1. Reported CEX consumption  6.34  11.43  16.64  22.62  42.96  .361  4,963 
3.  Reported CEX income after taxes  5.14  9.23  14.54  21.87  49.22  .436  6,455 
11.  Consumer units, head age < 65 
3.  Reported CEX income after taxes  5.81  12.39  17.69  23.65  40.48  ,348  12,260 
111.  Consumer units, head age > 64 
2.  Adjusted consumption  6.51  12.07  16.99  22.79  41.65  ,348  5,794 
4.  Adjusted income after taxes  5.20  9.72  15.14  22.39  47.54  ,421  7,997 244  Danzigerlvan der Gaag ISmolenskyITaussig 
consumer expenditures exceed reported consumption, on average, by 17 
percent ($5794/ $4963 in table 7.1). 
In contrast to the effects on consumption, income after direct state and 
federal taxes changes considerably, both for elderly and for all other 
consumer units, after we add to the CEX income measure the estimated 
rental value of durables, vehicles, and owner-occupied houses. For exam- 
ple, for elderly households in the first quintile of the size distribution of 
income for the whole sample, the change is as large as 40 percent; for the 
nonelderly in the same quintile, it is 24percent. On average, our adjusted 
income measure is 16 percent higher than the reported measure from the 
CEX for consumer units under age 65 ($14,217/$12,260) and 24 percent 
higher ($7997/$6455) for the elderly. 
Table 7.1 provides further details on the effects of our adjustments of 
the CEX measures of consumption and income after taxes, for all con- 
sumer units and then separately for units headed by the elderly (age 65 
and over) and the nonelderly. The size distributions-before  and after 
our adjustments-are  each summarized by  their quintile shares, Gini 
coefficients, and means. Adjusting income and consumption to incorpo- 
rate flows from durable goods generally results in higher mean economic 
welfare and lower inequality for all groups than is shown by the reported 
CEX data. These results cast doubts on the empirical findings of  other 
studies that have used the reported CEX data (or Current Population 
Survey data or other data sets that do not account for service flows from 
durable goods), especially those studies that have made comparisons 
across age groups. 
7.3  Measures of Economic Status 
We turn  now to the relative economic status of  the elderly under 
different treatments of the income and recipient unit concepts. The vast 
literature on empirical measures of  inequality has examined the issues 
involved in defining these concepts in depth, and we will not repeat here 
all the familiar points!  Instead we present a number of  such measures 
with  a brief  discussion of  why  each is included. We then proceed  to 
compare  and contrast their empirical implications. All  the estimates 
reported are based on the adjusted consumption and income data dis- 
cussed in section 7.2. 
One measure of economic status we emphasize is income before taxes, 
but including cash transfers and the bonus value of food stamps (YBT). 
We do so, even though transfers are properly the subject of  the next 
section, because YBT is the closest approximation in the CEX to the 
Current Population Survey’s (CPS) widely used money income measure. 
Because the elderly receive favorable tax treatment in the federal per- 
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measure understates their relative economic status. Hence, a second 
measure employed is income after direct taxes (YAT). Taxes are consid- 
ered as negative transfers and are discussed in the next section of  this 
paper.  However, because YAT is our best proxy for command over 
resources, it is our favored income measure in this section. 
Our third measure of  economic status is consumption  (C). If  the 
life-cycle hypothesis about lifetime saving patterns is valid, then a con- 
sumption measure would result in less-biased comparisons of  the eco- 
nomic status of the elderly and the nonelderly than an income measure. 
The reasoning underlying this assertion is stated in a recent study of the 
issues concerning the measurement of poverty: 
Measuring money spent on consumption rather than money income 
has frequently been offered as an alternative definition of  well-being 
because it eliminates much of  the transitory phenomenon of  unex- 
pected gains and losses manifest in current income figures. In other 
words, consumption stands as a proxy for long-run income. Available 
data indicate that replacing income with consumption as a poverty 
measure may have significant effects on the poverty count. Since at 
very low incomes, expenditures for consumption more often than not 
exceed income, a current income measure produces higher poverty 
counts than a consumption  measure. In particular,  a consumption 
measure would reduce the number of young poor, who are frequently 
suffering only temporary poverty, and the number of  aged poor who 
can maintain consumption by drawing upon savings.’ 
Although our own recent paper finds strong evidence contradicting the 
predictions of  the life-cycle hypothesis about the consumption behavior 
of the aged (Danziger et al. 1982), we nevertheless present consumption 
as an alternative to our income measures. 
Having settled on these three  “income”  concepts,  we  turn to the 
recipient unit. The average consumer unit headed by a person between 
the ages of 35 and 54 includes twice as many persons as the average unit 
headed by persons over 65. This suggests that some adjustment for unit 
size is needed,  but  the  appropriate  adjustment is not  obvious.  One 
extreme approach is to make no adjustments at all, that is, YBT, YAT, 
and C  are defined on a consumer-unit basis. The arguments in support of 
this conventional approach stress the voluntary  nature of  household 
formation and the presumed  utility gained by  persons who choose to 
share their incomes with spouses, children, or any other members of the 
unit (Lebergott 1976; Pollak and Wales 1979). If  person A with a substan- 
tial income marries person B with no income, whose utility decreases? 
Indeed, the new consumer unit of  two persons presumably has higher 
utility than the maximum utility level of  the previous two single-person 
units. 
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fining consumption and income on a per capita basis, (CIN) and (YAT/ 
N), where  N  is the number  of  persons  in the  unit.  The per  capita 
transformation of consumer unit consumption or income is easy to under- 
stand and mathematically convenient, but has little else to recommend it.8 
A per capita income measure of  economic status implies, for example, 
that when person A with a given income marries person  B with no 
income, her or his utility is halved; and further, that when the couple have 
two (planned) children, it is halved again. Per capita income or consump- 
tion measures ignore all economies of  scale and specialization and- 
relative to alternative equivalence scales-maximize  the distortion in any 
money income measure of  economic status that ignores the value of 
leisure time and nonmarket production. With this caveat, we will proceed 
to use the CIN and YATIN measures to highlight the extreme effects of 
adjusting consumer  unit  consumption  and income for  differences in 
family size and composition. 
Finally, we define four additional measures of  economic status: the 
welfare ratios CIN*, YATIN*, CIN**, and YATIN**,  where N* and N** 
proxy the number of  equivalent adults in a consumer unit derived from 
two different equivalence scales. The constant-utility equivalence scale 
denoted by N* is based on the theoretical framework of  the Extended 
Linear Expenditure System (see van der Gaag and Smolensky 1982). The 
scale denoted by N**  is that implicit in the official U.S.  poverty lines (the 
Orshansky poverty lines). The two equivalence scales are quite different 
(see appendix B for a more complete discussion), although they lead to 
quite similar empirical results in this study. The constant-utility equiva- 
lence scale is less sensitive to family size because all commodities are 
considered in the Extended Linear Expenditure System on which it is 
based, while the Orshansky scale is based solely on varying food require- 
ments with family size, for which economies of scale are less than for total 
consumption. 
We have then three income concepts-income  before taxes (YBT), 
income after taxes (YAT), and consumption (C). We also have four 
recipient unit concepts-the  household, the two equivalence scales, and 
the per capita adjustment (see table 7.2).  Rather than report on all twelve 
cells, however, we report on only nine: income before taxes (YBT), 
income after taxes (YAT), and consumption (C) on a per consumer unit 
basis; per capita income after taxes (YATIN), and per capita consump- 
tion (CIN); the welfare ratios based on our constant-utility equivalence 
scale for income (YAT/N*) and for consumption (CIN*); and the welfare 
ratios based on the equivalence scale implicit in the Orshansky poverty 
lines for income (YAT/N**) and consumption (CIN**). Income after 
taxes is our preferred income concept, since it is our best indicator of a 
unit’s command over resources, and N* is our preferred equivalence scale 
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Table 7.2  Alternative Measures of Economic Status: Income and Recipient 
Unit Concepts 
Recipient Unit Concepts 
Constant-Utility  Orshansky 
Income  Per Con-  Equivalence  Equivalence  Per 
Concepts  sumer Unit  Scale  Scale  Capita 
YBT  YBT 
YAT  YAT  YATIN*  YAWN**  YATIN 
C  C  CIN*  CIN*  *  CIN 
Table 7.3 reports our estimates of  quintile shares, Gini coefficients, 
and means for our nine measures of  economic status for all consumer 
units. There are considerable differences in the mean level of economic 
status and of inequality among these distributions. As expected, the level 
of income after taxes is lower than that of income before taxes, and the 
level of  consumption  is even lower. The size distribution  of  income, 
whether measured by  the quintile shares or the Gini coefficients, be- 
comes more equal as one moves from YBT to YAT to C.  Our welfare 
ratio adjustments are normalized independently. As a result, their means 
cannot be compared. However, these adjustments to both income and 
consumption show lower inequality than do  the unadjusted counterparts. 
According to the Gini coefficients, per capita income and per capita 
consumption are distributed more unequally than their unadjusted coun- 
terparts, but the ranking is ambiguous because the Lorenz curves of the 
respective distributions intersect: the per capita distributions have larger 
shares of  total income or consumption  in the bottom quintiles even 
though they are more unequal as ranked by comparisons of  Gini coef- 
ficients. Therefore we cannot give unambiguous social welfare rankings 
unless we specify a social inequality aversion parameter (Atkinson 1970). 
Note finally that the use of  either welfare ratio as the measure of  eco- 
nomic status results in unambiguously less measured inequality than the 
distribution based on per capita income or per capita consumption. 
Table 7.4 gives the age-disaggregated counterparts of the data in table 
7.3. The two age groups are the nonelderly (household head is less than 
65) and the elderly (head is 65 and over). Consider first the data for YBT. 
Mean YBT for the elderly is only about half that for the nonelderly, and 
the distribution for the elderly is considerably more unequal. Deducting 
taxes from income, or looking at consumption, moves the elderly closer 
in terms of  both means and Ginis, but large gaps remain. This simple 
relationship does not hold, however, once we turn to the distribution of 
per capita income after taxes and per capita consumption expenditures. 
According to both of these results, units headed by the elderly are almost Table 7.3  Quintile Shares, Gini Coefficients, and Means by Alternative Measures of  Economic Status, All Consumer Units, 1973 
Quintile  Shares  Gini  Mean 
1  2  3  4  5  ficient  Status 
Coef-  Economic 
1.  Income before taxes (YBT)  4.59  10.68  16.92  24.76  43.04  .391  $14,918 
2.  Income after taxes (YAT)  4.96  11.14  17.19  24.50  42.21  ,377  12,989 
3.  Consumption (C)  6.90  12.64  17.45  23.56  39.44  .327  9,014 
4.  Constant utility welfare ratio- 
5.  Constant utility welfare ratio- 
6.  Poverty line welfare ratio- 
7.  Poverty line welfare ratio- 
8.  Per capita income (YATIN)  5.78  11.08  15.99  22.65  44.50  ,385  5,204 
9.  Per capita consumption (C/N)  7.13  11.75  15.87  21.79  43.46  ,360  3,756 
income (YAT/N*)  6.58  12.83  17.63  22.94  40.02  .333  1.86" 
consumption (C/N*)  8.70  13.84  17.64  22.33  37.49  .286  1.32" 
income (YAT/N**)  5.99  12.21  17.11  23.10  41.59  ,353  3.60" 
consumption (C/N**)  8.08  13.29  17.32  22.25  39.06  ,307  2.54" 
~~ 
Each consumer unit's income is entered once in the computation of the summary measures of  economic status. 
"These measures have been normalized with a family of  four as the reference group. 249  Income Transfers and the Economic Status of  the Elderly 
as well-off on average as are units headed by the nonelderly-$4852  vs. 
$5291 for YATIN and $3625 vs. $3788 for CIN. The Gini coefficient of 
YATIN is also quite similar for the two groups, .382 and .385, while the 
Gini of  CIN is substantially lower for the elderly, .328 vs.  .368. The 
distributions based on our welfare ratio measures are between those of 
the unadjusted and the per capita measures. We conclude from these 
results that comparisons of the relative economic status of the elderly and 
nonelderly are more sensitive to the treatment of the recipient unit (per 
consumer unit, per capita, per equivalent adult) than they are to the 
treatment of  the income concept (YBT, YAT, C). 
Table 7.5 is identical to table 7.4 except for the method of weighting the 
recipient units. In table 7.4 we follow the standard practice of construct- 
ing size distributions by taking each consumer unit's economic status as 
one entry in the size distribution, whatever the number of persons in the 
unit. As Danziger and Taussig (1979) have argued, this conventional 
approach is inconsistent with individualistic social welfare functions in 
which each person's  welfare is valued equally. In table 7.5 we use an 
alternative weighting procedure that counts the income of  a unit of  n 
persons one time for each of the n persons in the unit. This equal-person- 
weighting procedure is more appropriate than the standard equal-unit- 
weighting procedure  if  we  are to interpret  the inequality parameter 
estimates as measures  of  inequality among individuals? Because the 
incomes of consumer units are positively correlated with the number of 
persons in the unit, we expect to find less inequality in the equal-person- 
weighting results. 
A comparison of the corresponding entries in tables 7.4 and 7.5 shows 
that this expectation is fulfilled for units headed by the nonelderly. For all 
nine measures of  economic status, inequality is unambiguously smaller 
when computed with equal-person weighting. For the three income mea- 
sures that do not adjust for unit size, the means are higher, while for five 
of  the six measures that are adjusted for unit size, they are lower. For 
units headed by the elderly, except for the per capita measures, inequal- 
ity is lower and the means are higher. However, the effects of  person 
weighting are less equalizing for the elderly than for the nonelderly. The 
contrast between the magnitudes of  the changes resulting from person 
weighting for the two groups reflects differences between them in the 
relation between size of  income (or consumption) and the size of  the 
consumer unit,  and the fact that the elderly live in  smaller units on 
average with much less variation in size.'O 
Table 7.6 briefly summarizes our findings (all based  on the equal 
person weights, as in table 7.5). The economic status of  units headed by 
the elderly is about 60 percent of that of units headed by the nonelderly 
where either income after direct taxes or consumption per unit is the 
measure of economic status. By per capita income or consumption mea- Table 7.4  Quintile Shares, Gini Coefficients, and Means by Alternative Measures of Economic Status, 1973, 
Consumer Unit Weights, by Age 
Gini  Mean 
Coef-  Economic 
1  2  3  4  5  ficient  Status 
Quintile Shares 
I. Consumer units, head age < 65 
1.  Income before taxes (YBT)  5.50 
2.  Income after taxes (YAT)  5.78 
3.  Consumption (C)  7.80 
4.  Constant utility welfare ratio- 
income (YAT/N*)  6.85 
5.  Constant utility welfare ratio- 
consumption (C/N*)  9.02 
6.  Poverty line welfare ratio- 
income (YAT/N**)  6.34 
7.  Poverty line welfare ratio- 
consumption (C/N*  *)  8.36 
8. Per capita income after taxes (YATIN)  5.65 



















13.23  18.08  22.96  38.87  .318  1.91 
14.24  17.66  22.06  37.03  ,278  1.34 


















11.57 11.  Consumer units, head age > 64 
1. Income before taxes (YBT)  4.93  9.14  14.40  21.73  49.80  .444  8,604 
2.  Income after taxes (YAT)  5.20  9.72  15.14  22.39  47.54  ,421  7,997 
3.  Consumption (C)  6.51  12.07  16.99  22.79  41.65  .348  5,794 
4.  Constant utility welfare ratio- 
5.  Constant utility welfare ratio- 
6.  Poverty line welfare ratie 
7.  Poverty line welfare ratio- 
8. Per capita income after taxes (YATIN)  6.36  10.96  15.63  22.26  44.8  ,382  4,852 
9.  Per capita consumption (CIN)  7.51  12.50  16.72  22.86  40.41  .328  3,625 
income (YAT/N*)  6.44  10.96  15.63  22.12  44.84  ,380  1.63 
consumption (C/N*)  7.79  12.83  17.16  22.64  39.58  ,318  1.21 
income (YAT/N**)  5.85  10.44  15.75  22.28  45.68  .395  3.04 
consumption (C/N*  *)  7.30  12.58  17.37  22.83  39.91  .325  2.22 
Each consumer unit’s income is entered once in the computations of  the summary measures of economic status. Table 7.5  Quintile Shares, Gini Coefficients, and Means by Alternative Measures of Economic Status, 1973, Person Weights, by Age 
Quintile Shares  Gini  Mean 
1  2  3  4  5  ficient  Status 
Coef-  Economic 
I. Consumer units, head age < 65 
1. Income before taxes (YBT)  6.30  12.65  18.05  23.55  39.46  .331  $18,064 
2.  Income after taxes (YAT)  6.63  12.98  18.29  23.66  38.44  ,321  15,702 
3.  Consumption (C)  8.64  13.91  18.13  23.06  36.27  ,276  10,667 
4.  Constant utility welfare ratio- 
income (YAT/N*)  7.44  13.62  18.25  22.89  37.79  ,302  1.91 
5.  Constant utility welfare ratio- 
consumption (C/N*)  9.55  14.70  18.13  22.45  35.14  .255  1.31 
6.  Poverty line welfare ratio- 
income (YAT/N**)  6.62  12.86  17.50  23.06  39.96  .331  3.50 
7.  Poverty line welfare ratio- 
consumption (C/N*  *)  8.68  13.74  17.73  22.43  37.42  .286  2.39 
8. Per capita income after taxes (YATIN)  5.69  11.52  16.45  22.68  43.67  ,376  4,313 
9.  Per capita consumption 
expenditures (CIN)  7.15  12.50  16.50  21.82  42.02  .343  2,975 11.  Consumer units, head age > 64 
1. Income before taxes (YBT)  4.93  9.74  14.77  21.96  48.60  .431  9,892 
2.  Income after taxes (YAT)  5.24  10.38  15.54  22.49  46.35  .407  9,155 
3.  Consumption (C)  6.91  12.54  17.09  22.66  40.79  .335  6,498 
4.  Constant utility welfare ratie- 
income (YAT/N*)  6.40  11.29  15.72  22.13  44.46  .375  1.68 
5. Constant utility welfare ratio- 
6.  Poverty line welfare ratio- 
7.  Poverty line welfare ratio- 
consumption (C/N*)  8.16  12.95  17.33  22.57  38.98  .308  1.21 
income (YAT/N**)  5.72  10.70  15.82  22.45  45.32  .392  3.17 
consumption (C/N*  *)  7.32  12.67  17.48  22.89  39.64  .321  2.26 
8.  Per capita income after taxes (YATIN)  5.78  10.89  15.87  22.50  44.96  .389  4,609 
9.  Per capita consumption (CIN)  7.16  12.43  17.18  22.79  40.44  .331  3,339 
NOTE:  Each consumer unit’s income is entered as many times as there are persons in the unit in the computations of  the summary measures of  economic 
status. Table 7.6  The Economic Status of Elderly Units Relative to Nonelderly Units: A Summary" 
Measure of Economic Status 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
YATIN  CIN  YBT  YAT  C  YATIN*  CIN*  YATIN**  CIN" 
Mean economic status of  elderly 
Mean economic status of nonelderly  .55  .58  .61  .88  .92  .91  .95  1.07  1.12 
Gini coefficient for elderly 
Gini coefficient for nonelderly  1.30  1.27  1.21  1.24  1.21  1.18  1.12  1.03  .97 
Percent of elderly in bottom quintile 
Percent of nonelderly in bottom quintile  3.46  3.10  3.36  1.86  1.73  1.69  1.44  .97  .79 
Percent of  bottom quintile who are elderlyb  30.9  28.7  30.3  19.4  18.3  17.9  15.7  11.2  9.3 
"All results are based on equal person weights, as in table 7.5. 
bPersons in consumer units with elderly heads are 11.5 percent of all persons. 255  Income Transfers and the Economic Status of  the Elderly 
sures, however, the elderly are somewhat better-off than younger con- 
sumer units. The welfare ratio measures lie in between." They show the 
elderly to be 88-95  percent as well-off as the nonelderly. Row 2 summa- 
rizes the data on relative  inequality.  The per  capita  measures  show 
similar degrees of inequality for the two groups. On the other measures, 
the Gini coefficient is from 12 to 30 percent greater among units headed 
by the elderly. The data in row 3 show that elderly units are more than 
three times more likely to be in the lowest quintile of the size distribution 
of economic status than nonelderly units if we rank consumer units on the 
basis of income before or  after taxes or consumption, but about 3 percent 
less likely on a per capita income, and about 20 percent less likely on a per 
capita consumption, basis. The welfare ratio measures show the elderly 
to be 44-86  percent more likely to be in the lowest quintile. Finally, the 
last row shows that about 30 percent of the units in the bottom quintile are 
elderly when the measures of  economic status are not adjusted by any 
equivalence scale, about 10 percent based on the per capita measures, 
and 16-20  percent for the welfare ratio measures. 
We can now summarize the numerous numbers in this section: 
. 
7.4 
Units headed by the elderly are clearly worse-off economically than 
those headed by the nonelderly on the basis of income before or after 
taxes or consumption, if no adjustments for family size and composi- 
tion are made. 
They are about as well-off as the nonelderly on a per capita basis, 
whether judged by income after taxes or by consumption. 
The results on the basis of the constant utility welfare ratio measures 
and the welfare ratio measures  based  on the implicit Orshansky 
poverty line equivalence scales are intermediate between these two 
extremes. 
These estimates strongly suggest that the consumer unit issue is more 
important than the income concept (consumption vs. income) issue 
in  resolving the  question  of  the  relative  economic status of  the 
elderly. 
The Net Effects of Transfers on Economic Status 
We now turn to the role of the net effects of transfers and taxes on the 
economic status of  elderly units relative to nonelderly units, and on the 
degree of inequality within each age group. Some tax effects are apparent 
in the comparisons already made between YBT and YAT. However, 
both of these measures include transfer income, which we now isolate for 
special attention. 
The CEX attempted to obtain a rather full accounting of  transfers- 
private as well as public. Data were collected, and hence included in 
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ment, federal retirement, state and  local retirement,  unemployment 
insurance, public  assistance,  workers’ compensation,  and  “all  other 
money receipts”).  In addition, the CEX collected data on the bonus 
value of food stamps, which are also included in YAT. Questions were 
not asked about other in-kind public transfers. 
As with most surveys, underreporting of transfers is a problem. Taking 
the National Income Accounts as the benchmark, Social Security benefits 
are underreported by 3 percent. Other transfer payments average 78.3 
percent of their benchmark, with different underreporting rates for each 
program. Dalrymple (1980) attempted several corrections for underre- 
porting  and found  they  do not  have a  large impact on a variety  of 
inequality measures. 
Table 7.7 presents five pretransfer income measures of economic status 
for both the elderly and the nonelderly.  For each consumer unit, the 
pretransfer measure is defined as the value of income net of  all transfers 
received. After netting out transfers, we order all consumer units by size 
of pretransfer income and weight each person’s economic status equally. 
Thus the pretransfer distributions in table 7.7 are comparable to the 
corresponding post-transfer  distributions from table 7.5. The assumed 
counterfactuals in the pretransfer measures of economic status are naive. 
In the absence of  transfers, pretransfer incomes (and the size and com- 
position of  consumer units) would undoubtedly be different from the 
measured values. Because we do not have sufficient estimates of all the 
behavioral responses to the availability of transfers, however, we adopt 
the conventional assumption of no behavioral responses. The counterfac- 
tual for what consumption would have been in the absence of transfers is 
more difficult to conceptualize. As a result, we focus only on the effects of 
transfers on income. 
Transfers raise the mean economic status of the nonelderly by almost 5 
percent and lower inequality among them by about 7 percent. The effects 
for the elderly are much larger-the  mean economic status of the elderly 
is raised over 50 percent and inequality among them is reduced by about 
30 percent. 
Table 7.7 also tells us something about the role of  taxes. Comparing 
YBT and YAT shows that taxes of the nonelderly average 13 percent of 
before-tax income, while the elderly pay 7.5 percent. Taxes also slightly 
reduce within-group inequality-2  percent for the nonelderly and 3 per- 
cent for the elderly. For each group, transfers have a larger effect than 
taxes on both average levels of economic status and the degree of within- 
group inequality.’2 
Table 7.8 summarizes the data from table 7.7 and provides additional 
information on consumer units in the bottom quintile. A comparison of 
tables 7.6 and 7.8 shows that, based on the income measures of economic 
status,  transfers greatly  increase  the relative  economic status of  the Table 7.7  Gini Coefficients and Means, Alternative Measures of Economic Status, Including Transfers and Less Transfers, 1973, Person 
Weights, by Age 
Total Income 
Total Income  Less Transfers  Percentage Change” 
Mean  Mean  Mean 
Gini  Economic  Gini  Economic  Gini  Economic 
Coefficient  Status  Coefficient  Status  Coefficient  Status 
1.  Consumer units, head age < 65 
1. Income before taxes (YBT) 
2.  Income after taxes (YAT) 
3.  Constant utility welfare ratio (YATIN*) 
4.  Poverty line welfare ratio (YATIN**) 
5. Per capita income after taxes (YATIN) 
11.  Consumer units, head age > 64 
1. Income before taxes (YBT) 
2.  Income after taxes (YAT) 
3.  Constant utility welfare ratio (YATIN*) 
4.  Poverty line welfare ratio (YATIN**) 









































-  7.0% 
-7.8 
-  8.9 
-7.3 
-5.8 
-  27.3 
-  29.2 




+  4.8 




+  54.9 
+  58.5 
+  56.9 
+59.5 
“Defined as 100  *  [Economic Status - (Economic Status Less Transfers,)]/Economic Status Less Transfers,, where i = Gini coefficient or mean. Table 7.8  The hetransfer Economic Status of Elderly Consumer Units Relative to Nonelderly Units: A Summary" 
(3) 
Yz  IN* 
(4)  (5) 
YTT  IN*  *  YTT  IN 
Mean economic status of  elderly 
Mean economic status of  nonelderly 
Gini coefficient for elderly 
.38  .40  .58  .61  .70 
Gini coefficient for nonelderly  1.67  1.65  1.68  1.59  1.42 
Percent of  elderly in bottom quintile 
Percent of  nonelderly in bottom quintile  4.78  4.65  3.72  3.40  2.67 
Percent of  bottom quintile who are elderly'  38.22  37.60  32.54  30.59  25.70 
= YBT less transfers (which is roughly equal to factor income). 
YAT  = YBT less transfers and less taxes (which is roughly equal to after-tax factor income). 
"All results are based on equal person weights, as in tables 7.5, 7.6, and 7.7. 
'Persons  in consumer units headed by the elderly are 11.5 percent of  all persons. 259  Income Transfers and the Economic Status of  the Elderly 
elderly. Their relative mean economic status increases by about 50 per- 
cent after transfers. The other row comparisons confirm this finding. We 
conclude that the effect of transfers on the relative economic status of the 
elderly is large and does not depend on the choice of  any particular 
measure  of  economic status. The pretransfer  measures  of  economic 
status are as sensitive to the treatment of  the recipient unit as are the 
post-transfer measures. 
We gain further insights into the effects of transfers by disaggregating 
our CEX sample according to  various demographic characteristics. Table 
7.9 presents data, for eight mutually exclusive age-race-sex groups, on 
income before taxes and transfers (roughly, factor&ome,  YTT ); trans- 
fers, R;  taxes, T;  the net transfer ratio, (R - T)/YBT ;  and income after 
taxes and transfers, YAT. All of  the elderly groups have higher net 
transfer ratios than their nonelderly counterparts. Simple, two-way com- 
parisons of elderly and nonelderly groups, with roughly similar incomes 
before taxes and transfers, also show substantial differences in the net 
transfer ratios. For example, on average, white female-headed consumer 
units under age 65 and white male-headed units age 65 and over have 
roughly comparable factor incomes, but the latter group enjoys a much 
higher transfer income. Elderly males also pay less in taxes than the 
women and thus have higher income after taxes and transfers (YAT). 
The net transfer ratio for the men is positive; for the women it is negative. 
Table 7.9  Taxes, Transfers, and Net Transfer Ratios by 
Demographic Group, 1973 
Net Trans- 
Age-Race-Sex  Trans-  fer Ratio 
of  Consumer  Taxes  fers  (R -  T)/ 























$2,649  $457  -  .118 
794  3,463  + .369 
1,531  824  -  .055 
140  2,606  + ,904 
1,126  1,054  -  .008 
412  2,423  + .379 
437  1,943  + .356 
271  1,835  + .736 










= YBT -  Transfers  = income before taxes and before transfers. 
bYAT = m  - Taxes + Transfers = income after taxes and after transfers. 260  Danziger/van der Gaag/Smolensky  /Taussig 
A similar comparison can be made between the consumer units headed 
by a nonwhite female under age 65 and those headed by a white female 
over age 65. In both cases, the elderly group receives higher net transfers, 
and experiences a higher net transfer ratio. Again, although we do not 
show the data, these findings are insensitive to the measure of  economic 
status. 
A similar analysis for consumer units classified by more detailed cate- 
gories of  the head’s age (data not shown), shows that the net transfer 
ratios for heads less than 62,62-64,65-71  and over 72 are -.105,  -.003, 
+.282, and  +.621, respectively. Thus the net transfer ratio rises mono- 
tonically with the age of  the head. 
Table 7.10 gives further estimates of  net transfer ratios for the same 
eight age-race-sex groups. To hold income approximately constant, net 
transfer ratios are calculated within each quintile of YBT for the whole 
sample. The results strongly confirm the positive relationship between 
age and net transfers. Within any quintile, the elderly enjoy a higher net 
transfer ratio than their race-sex counterparts and their quintile as a 
whole.  For  example, in  the third  quintile,  the net  transfer  ratio for 
consumer units headed by white males under age 65 is -.089,  while that 
for units headed by white males age 65 and over is .188. 
We add further detail to our findings with a descriptive regression of 
rv 
Table 7.10  Net Transfer Ratios by Demographic Group, by  Income Quintile 
Age-Race-Sex 
of  Consumer 
Unit Head  1  2  3  4  5  Total 


















-  .089 
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-  .118 
.021 
-  .149 
-  ,109 
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-  .121 
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-  .096 
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-  .055 
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.016 
-  .089 
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-  .131 
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-  .055 
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-  .058  .127  -.110  -  ,145 
A negative number means that the group’s taxes exceed its transfers; a positive number, that 
transfers exceed taxes. A number that exceeds 1.00 means that net transfers are more than 
half of total income. The upper limits of  the first four income quintiles are: $3,694; $9,043; 
$14,480; and $21,140. 
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the determinants of the amount of net transfer per consumer unit (table 
7.11). The results in the first column are for the whole sample; those in 
column 2 are for units headed by nonelderly, and those in column 3 are 
for units headed by the elderly. The largest difference in the columns is 
the mean net transfer, which is negative ( -  $1627) for the nonelderly and 
positive ($2372) for the elderly. 
Net  transfers, holding income before taxes and transfers constant, 
increase monotonically with age. For the elderly, net transfers are lower 
for nonwhites and females, reflecting the fact that Social Security pay- 
ments, which are the largest component of  net transfers, are positively 
related to past earnings. For the same reason, net transfers are substan- 
tially higher  for those with liquid assets in  excess of  $1500. For the 
elderly, net transfers are, surprisingly, more income-tested than for the 
nonelderly-a  one dollar increase in YBT reduces net transfers by 28 
cents for the elderly and by  17 cents for the nonelderly. 
More detailed regressions that decompose the net transfer into non- 
welfare tmfers,  welfare transfers, and taxes (not shown) indicate that, 
holding YBT constant, the probability of  transfer receipt rises and the 
probability of tax payment f&with  the age of the consumer unit head. 
Given receipt, and holding YBT constant, nonwelfare transfers rise with 
age and sfare  transfers fall with age; given that taxes are paid and 
holding YBT constant, taxes paid fall with age. 
We made one further attempt to refine our measure of the proelderly 
bias in the tax-transfer system. Burkhauser and Warlick (1981) show that 
current-period  analysis overstates the “true”  redistributive impact of 
Social Security because a portion of current Social Security transfers are 
best viewed as a return to prior contributions. They estimate the annuity 
value of each individual’s total (employer plus employee shares) Social 
Security tax contributions and denote the difference between current 
benefits and the estimated annuity value as the “transfer component.” 
They estimate that the transfer component was, on average, 73 percent of 
the current transfer in 1972. 
Burkhauser and Warlick (1981) generously gave us access to their data. 
We constructed a matrix of the ratios of the transfer component to the 
total benefit. All Social Security recipients were classified by  five age 
categories, their race, sex, and by  marital status, and by  seven Social 
Security benefit  classes. The current  Social Security benefit of  each 
recipient in the CEX was multiplied by  the appropriate ratio and the 
transfer component was derived.  The earned annuity component was 
treated in the same manner as private pension income, that is, as a part of 
YBT ,  income before taxes and transfers. 
Table 7.12 presents the same data as table 7.9, except that the net 
transfer ratios are now computed with the annuity component excluded 
from the numerator and included in the denominator. The pattern is the 
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Table 7.11  Regression Results: The Determinants of Net Transfers" 
All Households  Head < 65  Head > 64 
Constant 
Family size 








Before tax, before 
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9,494 































-  63.34 
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7,661 
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-  161.80 
1,833 
2371.9 
Standard errors appear below regression coefficients. The constants for the regressions in 
columns 1 and 2 are estimates of the net transfer of a unit headed by a white male between 
the ages of 35 and 54 who lives outside an urban area in the southern region and has assets 
worth less than $1,500. 
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Table 7.12  Taxes, Transfers, and Net Transfer Ratios with the Annuity 
Component of Social Security Treated as Retransfer Income by 
Demographic Group, 1973 
Net Trans- 
Age-Race-Sex  Trans-  fer Ratio 
of  Consumer  Taxes  fers  (R -  T)/ 
Unit Head  ma T  R  m  YAT~ 
White male 
< 65  $18,232  $2,649  $457  -  .120  $16,040 
>64  8,027  794  2,677  + ,235  9,910 
Nonwhite male 
< 65  13,022  1,531  762  -  .059  12,253 
> 64  3,247  140  2,087  + .600  5,195 
White female 
< 65  8,579  1,126  993  -  .016  8,445 
> 64  4,264  412  2,026  + .379  5,878 
< 65  4,281  437  1,893  +  .340  5,737 
>64  2,384  271  1,581  +  .549  3,691 
All consumer units  13,964  1,930  963  -  .069  12,997 
Nonwhite female 
= YBT -  Transfers  = income before taxes and before transfers. 
bYAT = m  - Taxes + Transfers  = income after taxes and after transfers. 
same as table 7.9, although the differences between  the elderly and 
nonelderly are less pronounced. The adjusted net transfer ratios for the 
elderly in table 7.12 are about 60-70 percent of the corresponding entries 
in table 7.9. The tax-transfer  system clearly treats the elderly more 
favorably than  their  nonelderly  counterparts,  even  after the annuity 
component of  Social Security has been removed from measured trans- 
fers. 
7.5  Summary and Conclusions 
In the United States the concern with the economic status of the elderly 
has expressed itself politically in the last three and a half decades in the 
massive growth of  Social Security retirement and other transfers. The 
ongoing policy issue is whether current benefit levels in these transfer 
programs are now sufficient to accomplish their purpose of  maintaining 
the consumption standards of  elderly retirees relative to those of  the 
predominantly nonelderly workers who are taxed to finance these pro- 
grams. The logical first step in resolving this issue is to measure accurately 
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second is to evaluate the quantitative role of net transfers in determining 
the total resources available to the elderly. 
This paper has addressed these two tasks. We began by creating a new 
microdata set matching the 1972-73 Consumer Expenditure Survey with 
the Inventory of Consumer Durables. The match enabled us to estimate 
consumption  flow  and income flow measures of  economic status for 
consumer units.  This procedure increased the measured  consumption 
and income of the elderly considerably and the income of the nonelderly, 
but barely affected the measured consumption of  the nonelderly. We 
then used the adjusted consumption and income measures together with 
various adjustments for differences in family size and composition to 
produce estimates of  economic status. 
We concluded that the relative economic status of units headed by the 
elderly is very sensitive to how, if  at all, the unit's income is adjusted for 
differences in size and composition, but is much less sensitive to the 
choice of consumption or income as the measure of economic status. We 
then presented evidence on the effects of transfers on the economic status 
of  the elderly. The effect is large, as expected, and the results are not 
sensitive to our choice of  a measure  of  economic status, nor to our 
adjustments for differences in the size and composition of  consumer 
units. 
Although  many  elderly  individuals are  poor,  when  we  take  into 
account taxes, transfers, and household size, the elderly enjoy higher 
economic status than some other groups (e.g., households headed by 
women). Current policy, however, is to take from the nonelderly poor 
(through cuts in Aid to Families with Dependent  Children and Food 
Stamps) while holding the elderly harmless. There is talk of  deindexing 
OASI and SSI benefits, which would reduce benefits for the elderly poor 
as well as all other elderly. Ruled out is the possibility of  making Social 
Security benefits subject to the income tax, which would not adversely 
affect the elderly poor. We do not know whether these policy proposals 
flow from normative judgments, political swaps, or incorrect perceptions 
of  the economic status of  the elderly. If  perceptions of  the relative 
economic status of  the nonelderly underlie these policy decisions, our 
paper suggests reconsideration  to be in order. Whether measured  by 
current income or by consumption, where adjusted for consumer unit size 
and composition, the economic status of the elderly was on average quite 
similar to that of the nonelderly in 1973. If  this study could be replicated 
using current data, we would expect to find that the elderly are even 
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Appendix A  Description of  Methodology and 
Results of  Estimating Service 
Flows from Durables and 
Owner-  Occupied Houses 
For the present studyI4  we  treat consumer units whose members own 
certain types of durables and units living in their own homes as if they rent 
these  assets to themselves.  Rental values are added to income  and 
consumption, while expenditures on durables are subtracted from con- 
sumption. Thus we correct for the distortions that occur when expendi- 
tures on a new durable good are included in the reported CEX consump- 
tion measure, but the value of  services from durables already owned is 
excluded. This, of  course, is especially relevant when comparing home 
owners and renters. For renters, rent payments are included in consump- 
tion, but a similar category of consumption expenditures is not included 
for home owners. 
The CEX tape contains an estimated rental value of  owner-occupied 
houses. This value is added to both the consumption and income mea- 
sures for home owners. Mortgage interest payments, property taxes, and 
property insurance payments were subtracted from consumption expen- 
ditures. About 10 percent of  the home owners failed to report a rental 
value. This missing data problem was dealt with in a straightforward way, 
with the aid of  a hedonic rental value equation. 
To obtain rental values for durable goods other than  housing,  we 
matched  data from  the  CEX tape  with  data  from  the Inventory of 
Consumer  Durables.  The latter  data set reports information  on the 
presence, purchase price, and date of  acquisition of  major and minor 
durables, furnishings, and vehicles for each unit on the CEX tape. This 
information is used to compute yearly service flows from durables and 
vehicles in the way described be10w.I~ 
Major durables on the CD tape include cooking stoves, refrigerators, 
dishwashers, washing machines, television sets, and so forth.'6 If  a dur- 
able is present in a unit, and we have the additional information that the 
durable was purchased, received as a gift, or acquired with the purchase 
of a house, the unit is referred to as an owner. All other units are referred 
to as nonowners. 
Thus nonowners include units that rent their durables. The rent paid 
will show up as an expenditure on the CEX tape, which is appropriate. 
Nonowners also include units for which the use of a durable is included in 
the shelter rent of a house or apartment. This will result in an underesti- 
mate of  the amount of  services consumed from  that  durable. While 
shelter is  slightly overestimated, total consumption will be measured 
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[“I-.  €2 
The service flow in year t from a durable good is defined as 
S, = rrp, + (Pf -  Pt +  1)  7 
where r, is the interest rate in year t, andpt  is the price of the durable at the 
beginning of year t. 
Thus, St equals the sum of  the market rate of  return on the amount 
invested in the durable as valued at the beginning of  the year, plus the 
change in the price of the durable during the year. Since, for each durable 
that has been acquired s years ago, 
pf  = (l -  cryPo  7 
with po the value of  the durable at the time of  acquisition, and cr  the 
economic depreciation rate, we have: 
S,  = rtp, + (1 -  6)”Po 
= (rr  + 6)(1 -  8)Spo. 
We arbitrarily set the interest rate, r,, equal to .07.” The depreciation 
rate for 6 was constructed using information on the life expectancy of 
durables and durable specific prices indices. 
To be able to calculate S,  for each durable in the unit, we had to deal 
with a serious missing data problem. The value of the durable at the time 
of acquisition, po,  was reported only when the durable was acquired in 
1972 or later. 
We employed the following model to impute the value of a durable for 
owners who do not report po: 
y is unknown 
y  = a’X1 + el 
if  d = 0, 
if  d = 1  ,  (All 
(A21  d  = P’X, + €2, 
where y  is the logarithm of  the value of  the durable;  d  is a dummy 
variable: if d = 1,  the value is reported; if d = 0, the value is not reported; 
XI  and X2  are vectors of  exogenous variables, to be discussed below; 01 
and P are coefficients to be estimated; and el and e2 are disturbance 
terms. We further assume 
[I];[‘:  u21 cr:]  u2  andaz = 1.0. 
The vector Xl includes after-tax income and family size to represent 
the unit’s economic means and needs. The age and marital status of the 
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region, city size information (living within an SMSA or not), and an 
urban-rural dummy variable.’* 
The vector X, contains those variables that are assumed to influence 
the probability and frequency of  buying a certain durable. They include 
after-tax income, family size, home ownership, and the age and marital 
status of  the unit’s head. 
The estimation procedure is as follows: 
First the p’s of  equation (A2) are estimated using a Probit specifica- 
tion. The sample consists of  all owners. 
Second we obtain consistent estimates of  the a’s in equation (Al)  by 
means of  an ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression of  the following 
equation : 
where  XI  is the inverse of  the Mills’s ratio obtained from the Probit 
equation, and v is a disturbance term. The sample consists of all owners 
reporting the value of the durable at the time of acquisition. Table 7.A.1 
is an example of  the results. 
The first column can be interpreted as the probability that the owner of 
an electric stove acquired  this stove within the past  two years.  This 
Table 7.A.1  Estimation Results of the Model Predicting the Value of an Electric 
Stove (f-values in parentheses) 
Probit Equation 
Yes/No Re- 
Independent  ported Value  Equation A3  Equation A3 
Variables  (equation A2)  (with hl)  (without hl) 
Constant  -.290  (2.80)  -  1.475  (3.39)  2.141 (5.12) 
Income  .005  (1.99) 
Log income  _  -  ,305 (6.86)  .317  (7.06) 
__  __ 
Family size  .003  ( .21)  -.012  ( .67)  -.007  ( .41) 
Home owner  -  .744 (12.31) 
Age < 25  1.346  (8.56)  .370  (2.30)  -.191  (1.68) 
25-35  .500  (7.95)  .lo3 (1.16)  -.154  (2.12) 
_-  _- 
> 50  -.221  (1.35)  -.025  (  .29)  .131  (1.59) 
Male  .177  (2.33) 
Married  .252 (2.87)  .227  (2.56) 
--  -- 
Northcentral  -.190  (2.18)  -.202  (2.29) 
South  -.112  (1.36)  -.138  (1.66) 
West  -.042  ( .46)  -.064  (  .71) 
SMSA  .014  (  .18)  .001  ( .01) 
Rural  ,053 ( .58)  .050  ( .54) 
A1  .618 (4.88)  __ 
R2  ,108  -  ,087  - 
Number of  observations: 3730. 
Number of  reporters: 1040. 268  Danziger/van der Gaag/Smolensky/Taussig 
probability decreases significantly with the age of  the head (age 36-50  is 
the omitted class). It is also significantly lower for home owners than for 
non-home  owners. After-tax income has a slight positive effect on this 
probability.  These results are in accordance with what common sense 
would predict. 
The second column records the results of  estimating equation (A3). 
The value of  an electric stove at the time of  acquisition increases with 
income, as expected. Very young units buy more expensive stoves than 
do older ones. Units with a married head buy more expensive items than 
do those with unmarried  head^.'^ Furthermore, there are some regional 
differences. Owners in the Northcentral region spend less on an electric 
stove than owners in the rest of the nation. Finally, note that hl has a very 
significant effect, .618, with a t-value of  4.88; the null hypothesis of  no 
systematic selection in the sample is therefore rejected. 
Comparing columns 2 and 3 shows that the estimates for the coef- 
ficients of the age of  the head are seriously biased, unless we correct for 
the systematic selection of  reporters and nonreporters. The predicted 
value of  equation (Al) was deflated to correct for price changes during 
the year of  acquisition and 1972-73.  This deflated value was used to 
create a service flow for each durable in each unit. Since part of our study 
addresses distributional aspects of  income and consumption, a random 
term was added, drawn from a normal distribution with variance GNR,  the 
estimated variance of  the subsample of  owners who were nonreporters. 
Vehicles were treated in the same way as other major durables. Table 
7.A.2 displays income and consumption data before and after adding 
service flows from owner-occupied houses and durables. A sensitivity 
analysis revealed that our results are stable for a large range of  plausible 
values for the depreciation rate, 6, and the interest rate, r. This result 
should not come as a surprise, since a large part of  our adjustments 
consists of the rental value of owner-occupied houses. This rental value is 
not affected by our assumptions concerning 6 and r. 
The first  comparison  of  table 7.A.2 presents the  mean  values  of 
observed after-tax income. The familiar result is that average income for 
the elderly is far below the average income of nonelderly. The same holds 
for total consumption expenditures, as reported by  BLS. Not surpris- 
ingly, older units are more likely to own their homes than younger ones, 
but the average rental value of owner-occupied housing is slightly higher 
for the nonelderly: $1414 vs. $1261. The sum of  interest payments on 
mortgages and home insurance payments is  almost twice as high for 
nonelderly  as  for elderly  If  we  measure  the consumption  of 
durable goods and vehicles by their service flows, younger units consume, 
on average, $543 a year, while older ones consume only $278. Measured 
by expenditures on durables, however, the numbers read $1280 and $395. 269  Income Transfers and the Economic Status of  the Elderly 
Table 7.A.2  Consumption and Income before and after Adjusting for the Rental 
Value of Owner-Occupied Housing, and Service Flows from 
Durables and Vehicles (CEX-1973, after-tax income quintiles) 
Quintiles 
1  2  3  4  5  Mean 
Reported after-tax income 






Percentage home owners 
< 65 
65 + 
Rental value home 
< 65 
65 + 
Housing cost (mortgage, 
interest payments, etc.) 
65 + 
< 65 











After-tax income (adjusted) 
< 65 
65 + 

















131  229 
160  330 
201  341 
139  274 
424  791 
186  398 
4,690  6,619 
3,760  5,896 
3,344  7,213 
3,659  7,436 
to reported consumption 
< 65  1.02  .99 
65 +  1.23  1.15 
Ratio adjusted income 
to reported income 
< 65  1.24  1.15 
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1.17 
1.16 
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Thus, consumption of  durables is seriously overestimated by  expendi- 
tures on durables, especially for the nonelderly. 
It turns out that “consumer expenditures” is a pretty good proxy for 
the  “consumption”  of  the  nonelderly.  The  corrections  for  owner- 
occupied housing, durables, and vehicles tend to cancel. On average the 
ratio of  corrected consumption to consumer expenditures is 1.00. For 
elderly households, however, the results are quite different. “Consumer 
expenditures” seriously underestimate total consumption. On average, 
the corrections increase consumption by the elderly by  17 percent. 
Income changes considerably both for the elderly and the nonelderly. 
For elderly units in the first quintile, the change is as large as 40 percent. 
For the nonelderly it is 24  percent.  On average, income increases 16 
percent for the nonelderly and 24 percent for the elderly. 
Consumption and income measures  usually do not  include service 
flows from durables and owner-occupied housing. As our results show, 
this deficiency seriously compromises these measures as welfare indica- 
tors. This problem seems particularly important when welfare compari- 
sons are made among consumer units at various stages in the life cycle. 
Appendix B  Derivation and Estimation of Constant 
Utility Equivalence Scale 
As Muellbauer (1979), building on the work of Barten (1964), has shown, 
true-that  is, constant utility-equivalence scales can be constructed for 
consumer units of  various sizes and composition, once a system of  de- 
mand equations derived from a utility framework has been estimated. 
However, because of a well-known identification problem inherent in this 
approach, additional information is generally needed to calculate a com- 
plete equivalence scale. Van der Gaag and Smolensky (1982) and Ka- 
kwani (1980) demonstrate that this identification problem-entral  in the 
literature on household equivalence scales-can be circumvented if Bar- 
ten’s approach of  incorporating household characteristics in a demand 
system is applied to Lluch’s (1973) Extended Linear Expenditure System. 
The estimation of  true household equivalence scales then proceeds as 
follows: 
First, a set of linear Engel curves, household characteristics included, is 
estimated. 
From these estimates the parameters of the underlying utility function 
(Stone-Geary) are calculated. 
Finally, using the expenditure function dual to the Stone-Geary utility 
function, the following ratio is calculated: 271  Income Transfers and the Economic Status of  the Elderly 
e(uo  I hl) 
e(uo  I ho) ’ 
E= 
where E( .  ) is the expenditure function, giving the minimum amount 
of  money needed for a household with characteristics h to reach utility 
level u. 
Though the resulting equivalence scale is generally a function of  the 
chosen utility level uo  (and, hence, of income), the estimated scale turned 
out to be very stable over a large range of incomes. We therefore applied 
a constant scale here, one that does not vary with incomes. This scale is 
presented  in table 7.A.3. The equivalence scale obtained is generally 
reasonable,  though  it  differs  quite  a  bit  from  scales  commonly 
employed?] The age and sex of  the household head are important vari- 
Table 7.A.3  Constant Utility Equivalence Scale” 
Age of Head of  Consumer Unit 
Consumer Unit Composition  35  35-54  55-64  65 + 
One person 
Male  60  63  56  47 
Female  50  53  46  37 
Husband and wife  77  80  73  64 
Female head, child 6-11  56  60  53 
Couple, child < 6  76  80  73  64 
6-1 1  88  91  84  75 
12-17  90  93  86  77 





Couple, 2 children < 6  83  87  80  71 
6-1  1  95  98  91  82 
12-17,  6-11  97  100  93  84 
12-17  97  100  93  84 
18+,  6-17  110  113  106  98 
18 +  101  105  97  89 
6-11,  < 6  85  89  82  73 
Five personsb 
-  Couple, 3 children 6-11  91  94  87 
12-17,  6-11  102  105  98 
18+,  6-17  115  119  112 
- 
- 
“A consumer unit consisting of  a husband and wife with two children, age 12-17  and 6-11, 
is 100. 
bAdding more children to the household adds 4 or 5 percentage points to the scale up to a 
family size of eight persons. After that only 2 to 3 percentage points should be added. 272  Danziger /van der Gaag /Smolensky  /Taussig 
ables. From their consumption behavior at given income levels, it can be 
concluded that elderly and female-headed households seem to “need” 
fewer consumption goods to reach a given utility level than do younger 
households, especially those  headed by  men?’ The scale is also very 
sensitive to the age of children, much more so than with respect to family 
size. This is in sharp contrast with, for instance, the equivalence scale 
implicit in the official U.S. poverty lines, in which the age of  children 
plays no role, but family size is very important. 
Table 7.A.4  displays the ratio of the poverty line to the constant utility 
scales for selected households.  For elderly male singles and couples, 
respectively, the Orshansky scale is 17 and 6 percent higher than our 
scale. The Orshansky scale is also higher for units with more than five 
persons. The poverty (Orshansky) line equivalence scale is obtained by 
specifying food “needs” for households of  different composition. One 
would expect an equivalence scale that is based solely on food require- 
ments to be  more sensitive to family size than one that is based  on 
expenditures on all commodities. Economies of  scale in, for instance, 
housing and transportation, are much larger than for food. 
Our scale in table 7.A.3  does have two oddities. First, the difference 
between single men and single women seems quite large. Second, it is 
unlikely that the addition of one young child to a childless couple would 
leave their economic “needs”  unaffected. However, these results are 
direct  “translations” of  the regression results, as are the results with 
respect to the age of the consumer unit head. We therefore use it as our 
Table 7.A.4  Ratio of Poverty Line Equivalence Scale to Constant Utility Scale of 
Table 7.A.3 
Age of  Head of  Consumer Unit 
Consumer Unit Composition  35-54  65 + 
~~ 
1: male  .92  1.17 
2:  husband, wife  .91  1.06 
3: husband, wife 
1 child“  1.00  n.a. 
4: husband, wife 
2 childrenb  1.00  n.a. 
5: husband, wife 
3 children‘  1  .OO  n.a. 
6: husband, wife 
4 children  1.12  n.a. 
n.a = not applicable, because few consumer units with an elderly head have more than two 
persons. 
“Child is 6-11  years old for the constant utility equivalence scale. 
Two  children are 6-17,  the other is over 18 for the constant utility equivalence scale. 
child is 6-11  years, the other is 12-17 years for the constant utility equivalence scale. 273  Income Transfers and the Economic Status of  the Elderly 
preferred method for adjusting incomes for differences in the size and 
composition of consumer units. 
Notes 
1. The OASI benefit and beneficiary data are from Robertson (1981), tables 4.1 and 4.2, 
pp. 4243.  The U.S. Personal Income and population data are from U.S. President (1982), 
table B-20, p. 255 and table B-28, p. 265. 
2. See Moon (1977) and Moon and Smolensky (1977) for discussions of  the issues. 
3. We did not, however, adjust the weights used to expand the sample to represent the 
entire U.S. population 
4. About 10 percent of all elderly persons (2.0  million) live in consumer units where the 
head is under 65, while about 3 percent of all nonelderly persons (5.4 million) live in units 
where the head is over 65. As will be discussed in note 11, our results are not sensitive to our 
choice to classify all persons by the age of the head of  the unit rather than by their own age. 
5. See U.S. Department of  Labor, Bureau of  Labor Statistics (1977) for a complete 
description of  the excluded items. Consumption data are from the interview survey only. 
Expenditure items collected only in the diary were excluded and, as a result, we underesti- 
mate total consumer expenditures by about 12-15  percent. Our measures of  income and 
consumption do  not include the value of leisure and thus understate the “full income” of the 
elderly relative to the nonelderly. 
6. Danziger and Taussig (1977) provide a comprehensive review. 
7. U.S.  Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (1976), p. 30. Many of the same 
points were repeated more recently in U.S. Department of  Health, Education, and Welfare 
(1979). See, for example, pp. 30-31. 
8.  Nonetheless,  per capita income is widely used to make comparisons of  economic 
welfare across countries or over time in one country. 
9. Watts and Peck  (1975), Atkinson  and Harrison  (1978), and Kuznets (1976) also 
advocate the use of equal-person weights in estimating summary measures of inequality. 
10. The mean  consumer unit  size in our sample is 3.00 persons per unit.  Unit  size 
generally declines with age of head, and is less than 2.00 for units where the head is over 64 
years.  Our choice of  person weighting is designed to account for these differences. 
11. As mentioned above, all persons in a consumer unit are classified as elderly if  the 
head is over 65 years of  age, and as nonelderly if  the head is less than 65. Classifying as 
elderly those nonelderly persons who live in units headed by the elderly and as nonelderly 
those elderly in nonelderly units could bias our conclusions concerning the relative eco- 
nomic status  of the two groups. We attempted to gauge the extent of the bias by reclassifying 
all persons according to their own age. Thus persons under 65 living with the elderly were 
counted as nonelderly,  and those  over 65  living with the nonelderly were classified as 
elderly.  As a result,  3.7 percent  of  persons shifted categories. This, or any alternative 
classification, requires an assumption about how much of  a unit’s income accrues to each 
person. In this paper, to be consistent, we follow the standard procedure and assume that all 
persons in a unit share equally, whatever the age of the head. This assumption leads to 
relatively small changes in our results. For example, the ratio of the per capita income of the 
elderly to that of the nonelderly rises to 1.12 from 1.07. The results would undoubtedly 
differ if  we assumed  (as did  Moon  1977) that  elderly persons in nonelderly units with 
incomes above the poverty line received less than an equal share of  the nonelderly unit’s 
income. Of course, once the assumption of unequal sharing is introduced, it has implications 
for men versus women, and adults versus children in all units. Because we have no reliable 
evidence about the actual degree of  income sharing, we are unable to pursue this issue. 274  Danziger/van der Gaag/Smolensky/Taussig 
12.  Of course, not all taxes are included in our tax variable. On the other hand, not all 
transfers in our sample are reported in full. 
13. According to published Current Population Survey data (U.S. Bureauof the Census 
1981), the ratio of the mean income of  elderly families to the mean income of all families 
increased  from  .66 to .71 between  1973 and  1980. While  these  data are not  directly 
comparable to ours, an upward trend in the relative economic status of the elderly would 
probably be found if  we had a Consumer Expenditure  Survey for a recent year. 
14. This appendix draws heavily on van der Gaag et al. (1981), which contains more 
detailed information on the estimation and imputation discussed below. 
15. In what follows we restrict ourselves to all households interviewed for the CEX in 
1973. Furthermore, we restrict ourselves to service flows from major durables and vehicles. 
The value of  most minor durables (toaster, mixer, hair dryer, etc.) is small enough to 
warrant treatment as nondurables. Unfortunately, the CD tape does not contain informa- 
tion on the value of house furnishings. 
16.  For a complete listing, see section D of  the code book for the BLS Inventory of 
Consumer Durables public-use tape. 
17. In June 1973 interest rates ranged from 6.3 percent on taxable U.S. bonds, to 7.2 
percent on three-month treasury bills, to 8 percent on prime commercial paper. In general 
these were considerably higher rates than had prevailed in the preceding few years. See U.S. 
President (1982). 
18. This list of independent variables is not derived from any theory of the acquisition of 
durables. Our only goal is to get an unbiased estimate of y.  Alternative specifications were 
tried but none improved the coefficient of determination of the equation. 
19. We emphasize here that all these results should be interpreted for owners only, that 
is, very young units buy more expensive stoves than older ones, if they buy. We are not 
interested in the unconditional expected value of y,  since we impute y only for those units 
that are reported to be owners. 
20.  Edward Budd has called our attention to the fact that our imputation for the rental 
value of  owner-occupied homes is about 18 percent larger than the amount reported in the 
National Income and Product Accounts. This might lead to an overestimate on the relative 
economic status of the elderly because they are more likely to be home owners. However, 
our general conclusions on relative economic status are confirmed even when we do not 
make our adjustments for home ownership. 
21.  Our equivalence scale is a direct transformation  of  the estimation results of  the 
demand system. Hence it depends directly on the way we incorporated characteristics of the 
unit in the demand equation. For instance, no attempt was made to interact the sex of  the 
unit’s head with the age of the head. In fact, both variables were simply included as additive 
dummy variables. Consequently, the “difference” between male- and female-headed con- 
sumer units is the same for all age groups. In subsequent work, it might be worthwhile to 
experiment with various alternatives for incorporating characteristics of  the unit  in the 
system of  demand equations. 
22.  The same results were obtained from estimating the Extended Linear Expenditure 
System (ELES) using regional price variation to identify all parameters (see van der Gaag, 
Smolensky, and Lee 1984). Thus the conclusion that elderly consumer units “more effi- 
ciently” produce utility is not attributable to the savings assumptions implicit in ELES, nor 
to the fact in these data that the elderly are substantial savers. For more on the savings 
behavior of the elderly, see Danziger et al. (1982). 275  Income Transfers and the Economic Status of the Elderly 
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Comment  Barbara Boyle Torrey 
Introduction 
This paper addresses two basic questions that are raised by the enor- 
mous growth of  transfer programs since 1940: (1) How well-off are the 
aged today relative to the nonaged? (2) How much of  the present eco- 
Barbara Boyle Torrey is a fiscal economist with the Office of  Management and Budget, 
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nomic status of  the aged is provided by  transfers? The comparison of 
economic status between the aged and nonaged is complicated because 
the groups have different sources of income, forms of consumption, and 
life-styles. The biological relationship between these two groups is linear, 
but the economic relationships are more complex. In recognition of these 
complexities the authors used the 1972 Consumer Expenditure Survey 
(CEX) and the related Inventory of  Consumer Durables to develop a 
data base that is more appropriate to the economic comparisons between 
age groups than the data bases generally used. 
Although some of the methods in this analysis are not commonly used, 
the most important and controversial part of  this study is likely to be its 
conclusions, because they contradict strongly held public opinion. There- 
fore these comments will focus on the conclusions and suggest how the 
results could be modified by the biases in the study and potential future 
trends. Then some of  the public policy implications will be discussed. 
How the Measurement of  Economic Status 
Affected the Conclusions 
The first and most prominent conclusion, of  course, is that the eco- 
nomic status of  the aged is approximately 90 percent of  the economic 
status of the nonaged when equivalence scales are used. If  a value can be 
ascribed to leisure, then the aged would almost certainly be as well-off as 
the nonaged if not considerably better-off. 
However, as noted by  the authors, this conclusion is very sensitive to 
the measurement of the economic unit. The sensitivity  of the unit concept 
suggests that this is where we should be concentrating future research. 
Some would argue that no adjustment is necessary to make different size 
households  equivalent  because  people have voluntarily chosen  their 
family size to maximize their utility. While this may be true to some 
extent for the nonaged, it is hard to argue that it is as true for the aged who 
no longer have the option of having more children or, in many cases, of 
marrying. Therefore, when comparing the aged and nonaged, an equiva- 
lence adjustment for different kinds of  households is useful. 
The constant utility equivalence scale used in this paper is based on 
consumption patterns of different kinds of households for food, housing, 
clothing, transportation, etc. The authors’ estimates suggest that con- 
trary  to  life-cycle  theory,  the  aged  continue  to  save  rather  than 
dissave. This result was also found in the Survey of Changes in Consumer 
Finance and in the 1960-61  CEX. In fact, the aged continue to save at 
least the same percentage of their income even though their income after 
taxes decreases as they get older. One explanation of  this behavior may 
be that saving becomes more important to people as they get older and 
have fewer opportunities to increase their income. And, in fact, saving 
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consumption to achieve a target level. If  this were true, it would not be 
surprising to see different consumption patterns in men and women. 
Aged women should have more need to save since they will live longer 
and therefore are more threatened by declining income than men. But it 
also suggests that utility measures that look only at consumption may 
assume too quickly that utility remains constant as the consumption of 
the aged drops. 
An evaluation of the general economic status of the aged and nonaged 
requires not only a measurement of  the mean economic status but also 
the distribution around the mean. Therefore the second conclusion-that 
the Gini coefficient for the aged using equal person weights and equiva- 
lence scales was 18-24  percent higher than for the nonaged-is  impor- 
tant. 
However, when  the Gini coefficient is measured  using  equal unit 
weights, which is more common, the difference in inequality is reduced to 
16 percent and 19 percent for the two measures that used equivalence 
scales; and on a per capita basis, income inequality actually becomes less 
for the aged than for the nonaged. Using either unit weights or person 
weights creates some problems of interpretation. It is easier to interpret 
the results if unit weights are used for economic measures unadjusted for 
unit  size and if  person weights are used for the economic measures 
adjusted for unit size. This would also tend to reduce the variance in the 
ratios of  the Gini coefficients for the different measurement concepts. 
The aged income distribution would be relatively more unequal if  it 
were not for transfer payments. And this leads to the third conclusion 
that public transfers raise the mean economic status of the aged about 56 
percent and reduce inequality among them by about 30 percent. But the 
admitted naive assumption that there are no behavioral effects from the 
enormous public tax and transfer system means that the estimated effects 
of transfers on economic status of the aged are upper bounds. One of the 
authors, in fact, has recently surveyed the literature on how  income 
transfer programs have affected work and concluded that up to one-half 
of the decline in the older male labor force (and therefore the decline in 
their wage income) since 1950 is because of the Social Security program’s 
work disincentives. 
The final conclusion that the authors leave for the reader to make is 
that an adequate retirement income for the aged population  had, in 
general, been achieved by 1973 in the United States. Other studies, such 
as the one recently done by Michael Hurd and John Shoven, support this 
conclusion, but none of  the studies is as comprehensive in providing 
alternative ways to verify the results. Although some aged do not have 
adequate means, the majority appear now to have achieved economic 
independence,  largely because  of  the public transfer  programs.  This 
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opinion, as a recent Harris poll suggests. Part  of  the reason  for the 
misperception may be that the relative economic status of  the aged has 
fluctuated quite significantly in the past. Although we do not have compa- 
rable historical data for the better measurement concepts used in this 
paper, there is historical information for the ratio of  the median total 
money income of aged families with all families. Between 1950 and 1967 
this ratio decreased 16  percent, but between 1967 and 1980 it increased 24 
percent. (The ratio of  median total money income for unrelated indi- 
viduals 65 and over to all unrelated individuals did not change from 1950 
to 1980.) Apparently public perception has lagged behind the major 
improvements that took place in the relative economic status of the aged 
in the 1970s. 
The Potential Effect of  Research Biases and Future Trends 
on Relative Economic Status 
How well the conclusions of  this paper can be applied to the future 
depends in part on the biases in the research and how future trends may 
affect the populations described. The CEX data base, while better than 
most data bases, is still imperfect. Three specific qualities of  the CEX 
suggest that the relative economic status of the aged could be underesti- 
mated in this study and therefore improve relative to the nonaged in the 
future. 
The major omission in the CEX for the purposes of  this study is the 
information on Medicare services for the aged and the employer health 
insurance for the nonaged. Of course, a number of  conceptual problems 
are introduced when including medical costs in a measurement of  eco- 
nomic status. But because the medical utilization rate significantly differs 
between  the aged and nonaged and because consumption of  medical 
services is to some extent voluntary, it should not be completely ignored. 
Because Medicare and employer health insurance are not of equal value, 
their omission produces a bias in the results. The total compensation 
comparability study by the Office of  Personnel Management estimated 
that in  1979 the value  of  the employer  health  insurance  benefits to 
employees in industry was $1045. This compensation did not go to all 
employees, but of  those it did go to it usually provided family health 
benefits. The insurance value of  Medicare net of  institutional care ex- 
penditures was $1011 per enrollee in 1979. Therefore, if  both of  these 
values were added to the income of the aged and nonaged, the economic 
status measured by income of the aged would be increased relative to the 
nonaged. In addition, if  these insurance values of  health benefits are 
actuarial estimates of consumption, then consumption measures of eco- 
nomic status for the aged would likewise increase relative to the nonaged. 
And a utility scale developed on consumption data omitting these mea- 
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scale and therefore reduce to some extent the difference between the 
aged and nonaged. 
There are two other reasons why the CEX data base may underesti- 
mate the economic status for the aged: Over 50 percent of  the CEX 
respondents in 1973  who were 65 and over had a ninth grade education or 
less. Also, only 65 percent of  the people 65 and over owned their own 
home. We already know that the future aged will be significantly better 
educated  than  the present  aged both  absolutely and  relative  to the 
nonaged. And the 1975 Retirement History Study suggested that subse- 
quent aged cohorts will have higher rates of home ownership. This means 
that both earnings histories, which are directly related to education, and 
assets, which are directly related to home ownership for the aged, are 
likely to increase in the future and improve the economic status of the 
aged. 
However, at least two future demographic trends could reduce the 
economic status of  the aged relative to the nonaged. In another paper, 
the authors estimated that the mean income after taxes of couples over 71 
was 81 percent of  the income of  couples 65-71  years old (84 percent for 
single females and 101  percent for single men). This difference in income 
will tend to reduce the economic status of  the aged as more of  the aged 
become 71 and older (35 percent in  1970; 39 percent in  1990; and 44 
percent by 2000). 
In addition, both the Census and the Social Security actuaries project 
that the difference in life expectancies for men and women will continue 
to increase over time. Since women’s retirement income is lower than 
men’s the trend of increasing the ratio of aged women to men in the future 
would tend to lower the future economic status of  the aged as a whole. 
However, this also could be offset to some extent by the improving work 
histories of  the future cohorts of  retired women. 
The net effect of  all these factors cannot be predicted, but they will 
tend to offset each other to some extent. Public policy, of course, will not 
wait to be made until we know what the net effects will be. 
Public Policy Implications 
The authors discuss one major public policy implication of their conclu- 
sions, which is that the aged should not be disproportionately favored 
relative to specific needy groups in the society, such as poor, female- 
headed families. Therefore such options as taxing Social Security benefits 
should be considered as a deficit reduction measure before further cuts in 
transfers  to less-privileged groups  are taken. Although  taxing Social 
Security benefits would  reduce  the  rate  of  return on Social Security 
contributions to upper-income recipients, this should not be a binding 
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The aged today  look almost as heterogeneous in  terms of  income 
distribution as the nonaged.  And  therefore,  like  the  nonaged,  their 
poverty problems can no longer be solved by broad, general programs 
without enormous costs. Although much of the credit for the past reduc- 
tion in both poverty and the Gini coefficient for the aged can be attributed 
to Social Security, it will be a particularly inefficient vehicle to solve the 
remaining income problems of  the poor, when most of  the aged are no 
longer poor. 
The authors’ recommendations to tax Social Security benefits could be 
generalized to a reevaluation of  all the tax expenditures for the aged. 
Total tax expenditures for the aged are worth an estimated $16.4 billion 
in 1983, which make them together the third largest federal “program” 
for the aged,  not  counting the retirement programs for federal em- 
ployees. Federal revenues would be increased 2.5 percent if these exemp- 
tions were eliminated. Of  course, elimination would lower the mean 
economic status of  the aged slightly, but it would also lower their Gini 
coefficient. 
The other major non-needs-tested  federal program for the general 
aged is the provision of free and complete medical care to all veterans 65 
and over. This costs over $1 billion today and will double by 1990 as the 
size of this population doubles. 
But other questions should also be addressed. The present aged have 
inherited a substantial windfall from Social Security and Medicare. That 
windfall is partly responsible for their present economic status and their 
ability to accumulate and protect private assets. The next generation will 
inherit the private assets of  their parents, which are considerable, given 
the saving and consumption pattern of this cohort of  aged. And they will 
inherit it without an estate tax. Providing a windfall to the poor or to the 
aged has generally been acceptable public policy. But to have the side 
effects of  the windfall to the aged passed on to the nonpoor, nonaged 
children tax-free should raise questions about the future distribution of 
income. 
Of  course, longer-term issues are raised by  the conclusions in  this 
paper. Should the economic parity of  the aged with the nonaged that is 
demonstrated in this paper be maintained, and if  so how and by whom? If 
the present economic parity of  the aged is to be maintained, then that 
amount of  total personal income that is required to finance the federal 
transfers to the aged will have to increase from approximately 7 percent 
in 1980 to 8 percent by 1990 and 15 percent at the peak of the baby-boom 
retirement. Alternatively, other public goals would have to be sharply 
curtailed. If  the nonaged increased their taxes to maintain the relative 
economic status of the aged through 2010, but then did not raise their tax 
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deteriorate 25 percent relative to the nonaged. Under those conditions, if 
the aged wanted to maintain their present relative economic status, they 
would have to increase their own assets or retirement age. 
And this raises the question of  whose responsibility it is to maintain 
some economic parity between the aged and nonaged. In 1975 the federal 
government was paying 78 percent of all retirement payments to the aged 
and 54 percent of  their health care. The private sector was paying 15 
percent and 37  percent, respectively, with the state and local govern- 
ments paying the rest. Is this present division of  responsibility what we 
want to assume for the future? Or should we suggest that both the private 
sector and individuals take more responsibility in the future for maintain- 
ing the approximate economic parity that this paper has described in 
1973. 
The issues of  whether economic parity should be maintained between 
the aged and nonaged, and if  so how  and by  whom, are the obvious 
long-term policy shadows cast by the results of  this paper. 